I. Introduction
One of the stylized facts in the macroeconomics literature is the long and variable lag between the "money cause" and the "price effect."l The monetary transmission mechanism that underlies this relationship is poorly understood and is still a main bone of contention among macroeconomists.
Important policy implications follow from one's belief about the nature of the linkage between money and the price level. If monetary policy affects prices only after a long lag, then monetary policy may have large effects on the real economy.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it is to show that the observed correlations between inflation and current and past money growth may be long even when the structural lags in the monetary transmission mechanism are not, as in the case of an economy with flexible price^.^ This point should be obvious to those familiar with the literature on real business cycles or the rational expectations critique of econometric policy analysis.
Yet, we note that many economists, both in research and in policy arenas, See Friedman (1961) for an influential discussion of this issue. Purvis (1990) describes conventional wisdom about the lag from money to prices and the implications for policy. Rosenbaum (1985) presents a survey of the postwar literature.
This issue is also important for the central bank's choice of policy target. The belief in a long lag has induced many economists to advocate intermediate targets for monetary policy. This pervasive view is illustrated in an April 25, 1991, Wall Street Journal article by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond economist Robert Hetzel, who writes, "The obvious guide (to measure the impact of Fed actions on inflation) is the general price level. The long lag between monetary policy actions and changes in the price level, however, makes the price level an unsatisfactory guide." Tucker (1966) shows that a Keynesian model with short lags in the monetary transmission mechanism can generate data in which the lags from monetary growth to inflation appear to be long and variable. Tobin (1970) makes a similar comment on Friedman (1961) and his monetary research at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Lucas (1976) and Sargent (1976) show how rational expectations contribute to this identification problem.
continue to operate as if the implications of these models are not practically relevant. Our second purpose is to show why we think they are. We use a simple rational expectations model with flexible prices to explain why the lag between inflation and money growth appeared to be long before 1980 and why it has since disappeared.
In general, the covariance structure relating prices and money growth will be a function of the structural relationships in the economy, including the money supply function. Any change in the money supply function can cause a change in the observed covariance structure. Consider a simple model in which monetary changes feed immediately into the price level and the Federal Reserve adds persistence to monetary growth. To be explicit, let the logarithm of the price level be determined by the following:
where m is the log of the money supply and r , is white noise. The money supply is given by m, = m,-, + u,; u, = p u,-, +e,.
(2)
Growth in the money supply is an autoregressive process; e, is assumed to be white noise. The cross-correlations between inflation and past money growth will be proportional to the term pi/(l-p2), where i is the number of periods that money growth is lagged. In this simple example, there is no lag in the monetary transmission mechanism, but there can be a long lag in the crosscorrelation function relating inflation and monetary growth. All that is required to induce the appearance of a long lag between money growth and inflation is strong peristence in money growth. The cross-correlation declines with a smaller p and as the lag becomes longer. If the monetary authority changes its operating procedures so that the persistence in money growth is reduced, the lags from money growth to inflation will also appear to be shorter. Output in each sector is equal to some natural level (aj/(l-p)) plus a positive proportion of the perceived relative price change. The production process includes some unspecified source of persistence, represented by the first-order autocorrelation coefficient, p. Factors that cause persistence in output will affect the observed money-to-prices lag. It is possible that persistence in output is due to the structure of the money supply mechanism, but there are many nonmonetary reasons for persistence in real economies; examples include the time to build capital, the presence of inventories, the inability to transfer capital from one sector to another, the costs of training new workers, etc. This persistence was not part of the original Lucas (1972) specification, but it is one of the necessary ingredients for generating the apparent long lag from money to prices.
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm Output supply is affected by unanticipated changes in the money supply that cause a deviation between actual and perceived relative prices. Agents form rational expectations of the relative price, ptj -Ejp,, based on information available in sector j. This includes full information about the economy up to t-1 and the current local price, ptj.4 For simplicity, both p and p are assumed to be the same across sectors.
Demand for output in sector j is given by
The demand for sector output is equal to Xj, the log of the share of money used in the sector, plus the logarithm of real money balances, m, -ptj, plus a local shock, etj, that is assumed to be drawn from a stationary distribution with mean zero and variance u2. Monetary velocity is constant in this model, as in a simple cash-in-advance specification.
Monetary policy determines the behavior of the money stock up to a control error that is assumed to be random, drawn from a distribution with mean zero and variance uU2. The money supply is assumed to be governed by the following rule:
The money stock is equal to the money stock last period plus some constant growth component, p , plus some function of output and a control error, u,.
This simple specification captures some important features of the real world.
See McCallum (1989) or Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for an introductory discussion of the Lucas model. The notation and specification used here are similar to those used by Ahmed (1987) .
The log level of the money stock is not a stationary process; whether the growth rate is stationary depends on how the monetary authority responds to economic data. For nonzero values of b, the monetary authority conditions money growth on the level of o u t p~t .~ This is also an important ingredient of our model; if b = 0, then the policy is a constant money growth rule with noise, and the observed covariance structure between money and prices reflects the short structural lag in the money supply mechanism.
Aggregating over sectors, we get reduced-form solutions for inflation and the logarithm of aggregate ~u t p u t :
where 0 = -Z 0,, andfIj = -. The covariance function relating current inflation to current and past money growth is given as rp(k), where k is the number of periods separating inflation and money growth. For aggregate inflation, the covariance function is This may be thought of as a monetary response to the deviation of output from a constant trend without affecting our results.
To simplify this aggregation, we assume that all of the sector shocks were drawn from the same distribution and that aggregate output is defined as the product, rather than the sum, of sector outputs. See Lucas (1972) for a more rigorous microeconomic derivation of this model.
Expressions for the variance of inflation and money growth are
The observed cross-correlation between inflation in the aggregate price index and money growth will depend on the parameters p, b, /3, B and 0,. Figure 1 shows the expected cross-correlation functions relating inflation to lagged 
Empirical Evidence
The cross-covariance functions, equations (8) We say apparently because a major change in operating procedures accompanied the announcement of a disinflation policy on October 6, 1979. Our model does not include the details about monetary institutions and money demand that are needed to explain why the inflation rate was stabilized after 1979, but the monetary growth rate apparently was not. See Poole (1988) for an excellent discussion of this issue.
an aggregate nominal shock. This results in a very high contemporaneous correlation (not shown in figure 1 ) that would be substantially reduced if aggregate real shocks were added to the model. Although more realism could be introduced by adding other sources of disturbance to the system, doing so is not necessary to make our main point that changing the money supply rule can have a dramatic effect on the observed cross-covariance structure relating money and prices. From sometime in the mid-1950s until the late 1970s, the Federal Reserve followed a policy that resulted in an uneven acceleration of the inflation rate. This persistence in the inflation rate might result if the Federal Reserve was using our money supply rule, equation (5), with b > 0 and p near unity.
In October 1979, the Federal Reserve announced a commitment to reduce inflation and implemented a new operating procedure to enhance the credibility of the announcement. The result in the 1980s was lower inflation, which appears to have been random around a stable 4-1/2-percent growth trend. In our model such an outcome would result if p , the drift in the money growth rate, were equal to 4-1/2 percent per year and b were set equal to zero. The pattern of cross-correlations relating inflation and money growth that was observed in the pre-1980 data would disappear if the Federal Reserve adopted such a rule.
We use data from the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Producer Price Index (PPI), and the monetary base to examine the covariance structure before and after October 1979. We also examine the corresponding output measures (personal consumption expenditures for the CPI and industrial output for the PPI) to obtain information about the approximate size of the parameters in the Lucas model.
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In the real world there is no reason to expect the local shocks to sum to zero in each period (as was assumed in our model). Table 1 shows our estimates of p and a for personal consumption expenditures and industrial output. These are taken directly from the equation used to estimate the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the presence of a unit root (a time trend is included in the estimated equation). Although the estimate of p is often very close to unity, we can reject the hypothesis that the output series contains a unit root in all but one case. Again, with a time trend included, we can reject the hypothesis that the series contains a unit root for the early subperiod, but the estimate is very close to unity. The noise in the monetary base is small relative to the noise in output (at most, the standard deviation of the innovation to the monetary base is only half the standard deviation of the innovation to output); these estimates suggest that 8 is probably less than 0.2. Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (5) accelerating inflation rate to a policy that appears to be targeting inflation at a moderate 4 to 5 percent level (which would correspond to a constant 4 to 5 percent money growth rule in our model).
IV. Conclusion
Although we cannot prove that the observation of long lags in the money supply mechanism is an illusion, we can easily show that a long lag may be observed in the cross-correlations even if there is only a very short lag in the monetary transmission mechanism. We present a model in which the monetary transmission mechanism has a very short lag, but which can generate data that display a very long lag from money to prices.
We also show that the experience of the last three decades is consistent with this simple Lucas model of monetary misperceptions. The model predicts that if money supply growth is systematically related to lagged real output growth, as it was prior to the 1980s, then the lag from money to prices will appear to be long. Further, the model predicts that if the Federal Reserve announced and achieved a policy to stabilize the inflation rate, as it did in the 1980s, the long lag would disappear, In viewing the whole period, some might conclude that the lag was both long and variable. 
